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UID:pretalx-citizen-science-communication-trust-2026-ZUUR93@ifkw.rz.tu-bs.d
 e
DTSTART;TZID=CET:20261005T111500
DTEND;TZID=CET:20261005T113000
DESCRIPTION:Trust has become a central concept in research on science–pub
 lic relations. It appears in debates on expertise\, misinformation\, uncer
 tainty communication\, public engagement\, institutional credibility\, ope
 n science\, risk governance\, and the legitimacy of science in democratic 
 societies. Yet the literature does not conceptualize trust in a sufficient
 ly differentiated way. The same term is used to describe justified relianc
 e on experts\, confidence in institutions\, positive responses to communic
 ation strategies\, judgments of integrity\, willingness to accept policy g
 uidance\, and broader relations of recognition or exclusion. The field is 
 therefore rich in insight but uneven in conceptual precision.\n\nThis pape
 r argues that research on trust in science–public relations has develope
 d along four major perspectives: epistemic\, moral–value\, communication
 -effects\, and relational–institutional. Each identifies an important di
 mension of trust\, but they operate at different analytical levels and att
 ach the concept to different objects\, processes\, and evaluative standard
 s. Because they are often discussed as though they address the same questi
 on\, findings remain difficult to compare and accumulate.\n\nThe paper has
  two aims. First\, it clarifies how these four perspectives conceptualize 
 trust and what assumptions they make about science\, publics\, and communi
 cation. Second\, it develops an analytical framework showing how they diff
 er in both analytical level and conceptualization of trust. The study is b
 ased on a narrative review of 161 articles on trust in science\, science c
 ommunication\, expertise\, public understanding of science\, and related f
 ields. \n\nThe epistemic perspective understands trust as justified relian
 ce under conditions of unequal knowledge. It asks how non-experts can reas
 onably depend on experts and scientific institutions when they cannot asse
 ss the evidence directly. Its focus is competence\, reliability\, expertis
 e\, and warranted deference. Its main contribution is conceptual rigor: it
  distinguishes trust from mere compliance\, liking\, or blind faith.\n\nTh
 e moral–value perspective emphasizes that trust is also shaped by judgme
 nts of integrity\, fairness\, responsibility\, respect\, and responsivenes
 s to public concerns. Competence matters\, but it is not sufficient. Publi
 cs also judge how scientific actors handle uncertainty\, manage conflicts 
 of interest\, communicate values\, and engage affected communities. This p
 erspective shows that trust is not only an informational issue but also an
  ethical and political one.\n\nThe communication-effects perspective treat
 s trust mainly as an empirical outcome shaped by communication strategies\
 , media environments\, source characteristics\, and audience dispositions.
  It examines how framing\, uncertainty communication\, tone\, media exposu
 re\, and platform context increase or reduce trust. This perspective provi
 des valuable empirical findings\, but often uses a broad operational meani
 ng of trust\, treating it as confidence\, credibility\, support\, or favor
 able orientation.\n\nThe relational–institutional perspective places tru
 st within wider social\, institutional\, and political relations. Trust is
  understood as a socially situated relation shaped by status asymmetries\,
  institutional histories\, media logics\, power inequalities\, and the sci
 ence–state interface. From this view\, publics are not singular\, and di
 strust is not always a deficit. It may be a reasonable response to exclusi
 on\, failed accountability\, or marginalization.\n\nTo clarify these diffe
 rences\, the paper develops a two by two framework. The horizontal axis mo
 ves from individual and interactional judgment to broader social and insti
 tutional relations. The vertical axis moves from normative grounds to empi
 rical processes. The epistemic perspective occupies the upper left quadran
 t\, the moral–value perspective the upper right\, the communication-effe
 cts perspective the lower left\, and the relational–institutional perspe
 ctive the lower right. The figure therefore shows not just four types of t
 rust research\, but four distinct understandings of what trust is and wher
 e it is located analytically.\n\nThe paper’s main contribution is concep
 tual clarification. It shows that trust in science–public relations does
  not refer to a single phenomenon. By distinguishing four perspectives wit
 hin a shared framework\, it clarifies where previous scholarship converges
 \, where it diverges\, and why findings often remain fragmented. It also o
 ffers a more precise vocabulary for specifying what kind of trust is being
  studied\, whose trust is at stake\, what its object is\, and through what
  conditions it is formed. In this way\, the paper advances greater concept
 ual precision\, stronger theoretical comparability\, and more cumulative d
 ialogue in research on trust in science–public relations.
DTSTAMP:20260721T205150Z
LOCATION:Tagungsraum
SUMMARY:Toward a Clarified Framework of Trust in Science–Public Relations
 : Four perspectives and Their Analytical Implications - Yingjia Huang\, Zh
 enyunfeng Zhang
URL:https://ifkw.rz.tu-bs.de/citizen-science-communication-trust-2026/talk/
 ZUUR93/
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